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BOOK REVIEW 
IVF and Justice: 
M ora~ Social and Legal Issues related to 
Human in vitro Fertilization 
Teresa Iglesias 
The Linacre Centre, London, 1990. xii & 175, index. £9.75 
This book provides a detailed examination of several of the moral issues raised by in vitro 
fertilization. Its primary concern is with those moral questions raised by the status ofthe very 
early embryo. Most of the argumentation in the book is for the conclusion that the human 
em bryo, from conception, is a person. The practical implication of this conclusion is that 
IVF does not, and as a practical matter cannot, respect the embryo as a person and so must 
be judged morally unacceptable. 
Six of the seven chapters in this book were written and published in journals and books 
between 1984 and 1987. The effect of collecting them, providing a common introduction, 
and adding a chapter on the analogy between brain death and the beginning of human life, is 
a tightly woven network of complementary arguments for the claims that the early embryo is 
a person and that IVF violates the rights of that person. Consequently, the repetition which 
is unavoidable in a collection of this kind, and the absence of a single, systematic line of 
reasoning do not detract from the value of this book. 
The first two chapters deal with general questions in medical ethics, and with the medical 
reality and ethos of IVF. The main point is that IVF cannot treat the embryo in the way a 
person should be treated. Most fundamentally, the problem is that those who practice IVF 
have never, and, in the nature of the case cannot, take the welfare of the newly conceived 
individual to be the paramount moral consideration which would override social and 
scientific interests as well as the desires of prospective parents for a healthy baby. The most 
interesting and novel part of this discussion is the author's persuasive argument that there 
cannot be a "simple" case of IVF in which the standard moral objections are avoided. 
Underlying the conclusions of these early chapters is the conviction that the early embryo 
is a person. The author's arguments for this conviction are developed at length in the 
remaining five chapters. Two sorts of argument are presented: criticisms of the positions 
which deny that the embryo is a person from conception, and a constructive account of why 
the early embryo is correctly judged to be a human individual, and of why all living humans 
are persons. 
The critical discussion of the variations on the view that the early embryo is not a person 
contains little that is completely new. But it is a helpful and competent analysis. It is helpful 
because it addresses virtually all the objections to the view that the embryo is a person from 
conception, and states these objections clearly and fairly. Much of the argumentation is 
philosophical, but the author carefully avoids the analytic technicalities and obscurity of 
much philosophical writing. The author does a particularly good job of laying bare the 
philosophical assumptions behind the central objections: the mind / body dualism 
underlying the Lockean view of the person as a self-conscious being is exposed and criticized 
effectively; the reductionistic mechanistism implicit in much of the philosophical and 
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scientific literature on the beginning of human life is identified for what it is; and the 
questionable assumptions behind the prevalent view of rights which links the possession of 
rights to the actual presence of desires and interests are effectively addressed. 
The competence of the critical discussion is most evident in the author's replies to 
objections. Her answers, though not all equally compelling, are carefully spelled out and 
abound with common sense. Her response to the objection based on the belief that the 
natural wastage of embryos is at least as great as that involved in IVF is a good example: 
nature is not a moral agent but we are. 
The critical discussion of opposed views culminates in a capable dissection of the common 
analogy between the beginning and the end of life. The analogy is that just as we all now 
believe that brain death is the end of a person's life, so we should also be willing to believe 
that there is no life before brain activity exists. Iglesias explains why brain death constitutes 
the end of a person's life, and thus shows that brain death properly understood does not have 
the implication the analogy suggests but instead provides evidence that conception is the 
beginning of a person's life. For when the whole brain is incapable of further function, the 
organism cannot function as a whole and so dies (that is why brain death constitutes death of 
the organism), whereas in the case of the developing embryo there is organic functioning of 
the whole before brain activity exists, indeed from conception. 
The author's construCtion account of why the human embryo is a human being, and so a 
person, from conception is less developed than her criticism of alternative positions. 
Moreover, it is not gathered in any single chapter but dispersed throughout the book. Here 
again, many of the ideas and arguments are familiar: the embryo is a living, developing 
organism from the time of conception; its development is continuous, so that there is no 
point at which we can suppose that it changes from one kind of thing into another, and so on. 
Two aspects of this account are worth noting: First, Iglesias's analysis was developed 
before the appearance of Norman Ford's challenging arguments in When Did I Begin? 
Iglesias' response to this work would be most welcome. 
Secondly, Iglesias draws some conclusions about twinning and recombination from the 
philosophical biology she develops, namely, that while there can be fragmentation of living 
things, there can be no fusion and splitting of living beings as total wholes, and so no 
organically unstable embryos (p. 101). This might be an important contribution to the 
discussion of twinning and recombination, but needs development. In particular, the 
implications of this point for the debate about the significance of twinning and 
recombination are not developed. Suppose that embryos are not organically unstable and 
continue, as long as they exist, to be the same organism. This is compatible with an embryo 
ceasing to exist and several others coming to be from its parts, or even with these parts 
joining with other embryos or parts of other embryos. Such 'possibilitieis raise anew the basic 
question about twinning and recombination: in what sense can something capable of this 
kind of behavior be a human individual? 
In short, although not a definitive treatment of the issues it discusses, this book is a solid 
contribution to the literature. It provides an excellent introduction to the issues, and will 
repay thoughtful study. It is a good example ofthe serious, traditional moral arialysis which 
is being promoted by the Linacre Centre in London. Unfortunately, the Linacre Centre does 
not have a North American distributor for its pUblications. They are available only directly 
from the Linacre Centre: 60 Grove End Road, London NW8 9NH. 
96 
-Joseph Boyle 
St. Michael's College 
Centre For Bioethics 
University of Toronto 
Linacre Quarterly 
